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Goal-directed behavior is influenced by environmental cues: in particular, cues associated
with a reward can bias action choice toward actions directed to that same reward. This
effect is studied experimentally as specific Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (specific PIT).
We have investigated the hypothesis that cues associated to an outcome elicit specific
PIT by rising the estimates of reward probability of actions associated to that same
outcome. In other words, cues reduce the uncertainty on the efficacy of instrumental
actions. We used a human PIT experimental paradigm to test the effects of two different
instrumental contingencies: one group of participants had a 33% chance of being
rewarded for each button press, while another had a 100% chance. The group trained
with 33% reward probability showed a stronger PIT effect than the 100% group, in
line with the hypothesis that Pavlovian cues linked to an outcome work by reducing
the uncertainty of receiving it. The 100% group also showed a significant specific PIT
effect, highlighting additional factors that could contribute to specific PIT beyond the
instrumental training contingency. We hypothesize that the uncertainty about reward
delivery due to testing in extinction might be one of these factors. These results add
knowledge on how goal-directed behavior is influenced by the presence of environmental
cues associated with a reward: such influence depends on the probability that we have
to reach a reward, namely when there is less chance of getting a reward we are more
influenced by cues associated with it, and vice versa.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It has long been known that cues associated with a rewarding outcome can elicit and intensify
actions directed to obtain that same outcome. This effect can be studied experimentally in a
paradigm called specific Pavlovian instrumental transfer (specific PIT). In a typical specific PIT
experiment, a participant is first trained to associate two cues with two different outcomes: for
example, to associate two different images (Pavlovian conditioned stimulus, CS) each with the
delivery of a different reward (e.g., chocolate and popcorns). Then, the participant is trained to
make two actions to get these two rewards: for example, to press a left button to get chocolate and
to press a right button to get popcorns (instrumental training). In a final test phase, the participant
can again press these buttons in extinction (no reward is delivered) but sometimes one of the two
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images (CS) is displayed. What will happen is that during the
image display the participant will press the button corresponding
to the same outcome of the image more than the other button. In
other words, in specific PIT a Pavlovian cue associated with food
(or another reward) selectively increases instrumental actions
directed to the same food. This occurs despite the fact that no
explicit training of the instrumental actions in the presence of
Pavlovian cues is performed.
This PIT effect can play a critical role in regulating goal-
directed behavior in different situations of life, ranging from
advertising to drug addiction. For example, the vision of a
McDonald sign might encourage a person to buy a portion of
potato chips. In this case, the McDonald sign might be thought as
a CS associated with potato chips that promotes the instrumental
action of buying that food. PIT is also relevant for drug addiction
as drug-related cues can be a threat to self-control and often lead
to relapse after treatment (Hogarth et al., 2007; Belin et al., 2009).
While there is increasing progress on the study of specific
PIT neural substrates and mechanisms (Laurent et al., 2014), it
is not yet clear how specific PIT works at the functional level and
what its adaptive function and evolutionary significance is. Why
do Pavlovian cues influence our instrumental behavior through
the specific PIT effect? Which are the factors that mediate this
effect? It has been proposed that Pavlovian cues elicit specific
PIT by signalling an increased efficacy of the instrumental action
(Cartoni et al., 2013; Hogarth et al., 2013, 2014; Hogarth and
Troisi, 2015).
In Cartoni et al. (2013), we advanced an hypothesis and
a computational model on how PIT might bias instrumental
behavior by affecting different components of action evaluation.
In particular, we modeled one of the possibilities of how specific
PITmight be linked to the efficacy of the instrumental action.We
suggested that the specific PIT effect is elicited by the presence
of an outcome-associated cue that increases the estimate of the
probability of reaching that outcome. In other words, if an
instrumental response was usually rewarded 33% of the time,
the presence of the cue makes the participant think that the
chances of being rewarded are now higher (e.g., 50%). This
led us to the hypothesis that instrumental responses that are
continuously rewarded (100% chance of receiving the reward)
cannot be augmented further by the presence of a cue associated
with the same reward.
In the study reported here, we tested this hypothesis on
specific PIT by contrasting specific PIT effects in two groups
of subjects: during instrumental training, one was rewarded
with 100% reward chance for each instrumental action (button
presses), while another was rewarded only with 33% chance.
Other PIT studies have manipulated the instrumental schedules
in the past (Meltzer and Hamm, 1974a, 1978; Edgar et al.,
1981; Lovibond, 1983; Holland, 2004; Wiltgen et al., 2012, see
Section 4); however, to date we are not aware of any work
either with humans or animals that has directly manipulated
the instrumental contingency during training to see how the
size of specific PIT varies as a function of the instrumental
probabilities of obtaining an outcome. The closest manipulations
we could find were those by Trick et al. (2011), which used
Pavlovian stimuli trained with different contingencies and
Hogarth et al. (2014) where the participants expectations about
instrumental contingency during PIT test were manipulated by
verbal instructions. However, none of these directly manipulated
the reward probabilities of the instrumental training.
According to our hypothesis, we expected to find a stronger
specific PIT effect in the low-probability group (33%) than in
the high-probability one (100%); in this latter group the outcome
probability was already at maximum, so we expected a minimal
or absent specific PIT effect as the estimate of the probability
of being rewarded could not be further augmented by the cues.
Experimental results confirmed that specific PIT was stronger
for participants trained with a lower probability to obtain the
outcome by instrumental action. However, a significant specific
PIT effect was also found in the high-probability group, despite
the fact that the trained reward probability was at maximum. We
hypothesize that the uncertainty about reward delivery due to
testing in extinction might account for this latter effect.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Participants
A sample of 57 volunteer students (32 males) between the ages
of 19 and 30 years (mean age = 24.0, SD = 2.8) were recruited
from the Sapienza University of Rome. Following Prévost et al.
(2012), the eating attitudes test EAT-26 (Garner et al., 1982) was
administered before the experiment to ensure that participants
did not have eating disorders. Participants’ last meal was on
average 2.6 h (SD = 2.7) before the experiment start. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants, and the
Psychology Ethics Committee of the Sapienza University of
Rome approved the study. In Prévost et al. (2012), using a
paradigm close to the one used here, PIT effects were detected
with a sample size of 26 participants. Other studies also used
around 20 participants (Bray et al., 2008; Allman et al., 2010;
Trick et al., 2011) to detect PIT effects with humans, so we
chose as a stopping rule to collect at least 20 participants for
each of the two conditions (33% and 100% probability), after
considering exclusions due to EAT-26 results or the Assessment
Phase. From the initial sample of 57 participants, five were
excluded as their results on the EAT-26 suggested a possible
eating disorder. Eight participants were also excluded as they
failed to answer correctly the questions on the Pavlovian and
instrumental reward associations during the Assessment phase.
It has already been reported that participants unaware of the
contingencies might not express specific PIT, so it is customary
to exclude them from the analysis (see Trick et al., 2011; Hogarth
et al., 2014; Eder and Dignath, 2015). We then further excluded
four participants as outliers after analyzing instrumental training
data because they focused almost exclusively on one lever during
the instrumental phase. These exclusions left 40 participants for
the PIT test analysis, 23 participants for the 33% condition plus
17 participants for the 100% condition.
2.2. Stimuli and Materials
Visual stimuli were presented by a display (27 × 40 cm)
connected with a computer; stimulus presentation and behavioral
data acquisition were implemented in Matlab (The Mathworks)
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with the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997;
Kleiner et al., 2007). The food rewards were chosen from 14
different sweet and salty snack foods (Bounty, Cipster, Fonzies,
Freeky Fries, Kinder bueno, Kinder cereali, Kinder cioccolato, Kit
kat, Mars, Milka, Ritz Crispy, Smarties, Tuc, Twix). Participants
were asked to provide subjective pleasantness ratings for each
snack food clicking with a mouse on an analog scale displayed
together with a picture of each snack. The two most pleasant
foods for each participant were used as rewards. Two fractal
images were employed as conditional stimuli (CS) during the
Pavlovian and PIT test phases. Instrumental responses consisted
of button presses on a custom response box. The response box
had three buttons arranged in an horizontal row each equipped
with a spring to make pressing effortful. Only the left and right
buttons of the response box were used. Two black squares were
presented on the display: these squares became gray to signal
when response buttons were available for pressing during each
trial. When participants pressed a button, the squares briefly
flashedwhite. Food pictures (rewards) and fractals were displayed
between the squares.
2.3. Procedure
The experiment consisted of three main phases: an instrumental,
a Pavlovian, and a PIT phase (see Figure 1). These phases were
preceded by a “Taste test” phase and followed by an Assessment
phase.
2.3.1. Taste Test Phase
During this phase, the two squares are black, signaling that no
button is available. There are two trials, one for each food chosen
for the experiment. On each trial a food image appears and the
experimenter then gives a piece of the corresponding food in the
hand of the participant for immediate consumption. This phase
gives the participants a chance to experience the two foods in a
hungry state. This should enhance their motivation for pressing
in the subsequent phases and ensure that they “know the value of
the reward” in the hungry state.
2.3.2. Pavlovian Learning Phase
During Pavlovian training, the two squares are always black,
signaling that no button is available. For each trial, a fractal image
is presented for 6 s. During the last second of this presentation
(between 5 and 6 s) a food picture is displayed. Two fractals
are used and each fractal paired with one of the foods. The
associations between fractal images and foods were randomized
across participants. This phase is formed by 20 trials, 10 trials for
each fractal. A random duration inter-trial interval is presented
for 2–6 s. Before the phase starts participants are told to pay
attention to the abstract images that will be presented and that
each abstract image will be associated to a different food.
2.3.3. Instrumental Learning Phase
The instrumental phase is formed by 30 trials, each lasting
6 s with a variable 2–6 s inter trial interval. On each trial the
two squares are gray (instead of black), signaling that the
corresponding buttons can now be pressed to obtain a reward.
Participants are free to choose which button to press (any, none,
or both) and how many times to press them on each trial.
Button presses are both reinforced either with 33.3% or 100%
probability (depending on the participant group). When pressing
is reinforced, the corresponding food picture is immediately
displayed for 1 s. Food pictures signal that a small piece of that
food is won. Pressing a button also makes the corresponding
square flash white for 50ms. Before the phase starts participants
are told that food earned during this phase will be given at the
end of the experiment. At the end of the phase, a final screen tells
the participants howmany food pieces they won that far (number
of food images displayed) and the corresponding quantity of real
food. The quantity of real food won was automatically adjusted so
FIGURE 1 | PIT paradigm. The three main phases of the experiment: a Pavlovian training phase, an Instrumental training phase, and a PIT test phase. During the
Pavlovian phase, a visual cue (conditioned stimulus, CS) was presented at the bottom of the screen for 6 s, which predicted the appearance of a food picture on top
for 1 s. Two visual cues were associated with two different food pictures. In the instrumental phase, two small squares, spatially corresponding to two buttons on a
response box, both changed color from black to gray for 6 s during which participants could press any button for any number of times to win food rewards. Each
button was associated with a different food reward. The two food rewards were the same as the previous phase. Whenever the food reward was won, the
corresponding picture was displayed in the upper part of the screen. In the PIT phase the buttons were available but a big gray square covered the space where food
reward previously appeared. There were two types of PIT test trials: baseline trials without any visual cue; CUED trials where a visual cue was displayed, associated to
the same food as either the left or right button. These three main phases were preceded by a “Taste test” phase and followed by an Assessment phase.
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that all participants won an amount of food approximately worth
2 euros.
2.3.4. PIT Phase
The PIT phase is similar to the instrumental phase, with two
differences. The first difference is that the reward is never
displayed: during each trial a big gray square is constantly shown
where rewards used to appear, so this phase is carried out in
extinction. The extinction is, however, a nominal extinction
because as in Hogarth et al. (2007) before the phase starts the
participants are told to assume that rewards are still given as
before (i.e., they are hidden but still delivered). The second
difference is that in some trials a fractal corresponding to the
same reward of one of the buttons is displayed. This phase is
formed by 46 trials: 15 trials without fractals (baseline trials)
randomly mixed with 30 trials with fractals (15 trials for each
fractal, referred to as ‘CUED’), plus 1 trial without fractals at the
beginning. Before the phase starts, participants are warned that
the big gray square will appear so that theymay not see when they
are rewarded. Participants are also told that the abstract images
might appear again, without saying if they are relevant for the
current phase or not.
2.3.5. Assessment Phase
After completing the PIT phase participants are asked to answer
some questions to determine whether they are knowledgeable
about the relationships presented in the experiment. Participants
answer four two-choice questions, one for each of the fractal-
reward and button-reward relationships presented in the
experiment. In each question, participants have to choose to
which of the two food rewards the fractal or the action was paired.
Only those participants who reported the correct pairings were
included in the data analysis. The experiment was concluded by
a debriefing where participants could ask questions regarding the
experiment and the rewards won were given.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Training
During the instrumental phase, most participants pressed
both buttons in a roughly balanced manner, with an average
proportion of presses on the left button of 52% (SD = 17%,
see Figure 2). Despite using subjectively pleasant rewards for
both instrumental actions, usually rated at very similar levels on
the analog scale, four participants concentrated almost all their
efforts on one button only, with only a few presses on the other
button. These participants were considered as outliers in their
baseline responding and hence excluded from further analysis.
One of them explicitly declared during the debrief that he had
changed his mind about howmuch he wanted one of the rewards.
The participants could freely choose how many times to press
the buttons, thus the total amount of presses varied among
participants, ranging from 54 to 929 total presses over 30 trials.
As the rewards were delivered occasionally in the 33% group,
participants experienced different degrees of reward probability,
depending on the amount of presses and the luck of the draw.
Experienced probabilities thus ranged from 20% to 51% with
FIGURE 2 | Proportion of presses allocated to the left button during the
instrumental phase. Most participants allocated roughly 50% of their presses
to the left button, thus eperiencing the left and right button and their rewards in
a balanced manner. A few participants (four) focused almost exclusively on one
button and were considered outliers. Average proportion 52% (SD = 17%).
mean 33% (SD = 6%). Overall, participants in the 33% group
experienced an average of 81 rewards vs. 279 of the 100% group.
3.2. PIT test
During the PIT test, the two groups responded with similar
baseline rates: 11.2 ± 6.9 vs. 11.6 ± 10.3 presses/trial for the
33% and 100% group, respectively [t(38) = 0.19, p = 0.85]. To
calculate the strength of the PIT effect during the CUED trials, we
calculated a PIT strength index for each trial with the following
formulas:





PITstrength = Proportion− Baseline (3)
For each participant, we first calculated the average proportion of
left presses during the 15 baseline trials (Equations 1, 2) and then
subtracted this average baseline (Equation 2) from the proportion
of presses during CUED trials (3). Differences obtained during
the CUED trials with the visual cue associated to the same
outcome of the right response were considered as having the
opposite sign, so that all CUED data were positive when the
cue increased the proportion of presses toward its corresponding
button (see Figure 3).
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FIGURE 3 | Strength of specific PIT effect: proportion of choice
obtained by subtracting the average baseline from all trials. Positive
values mean shifting the responses toward the action sharing the same
outcome as the cue. During cued trials, both 33% and 100% group showed a
clear specific PIT effect, shifting their choices to the same outcome as the cue
by about 25% and 18%, respectively. In the 100% group, the specific PIT
effect was smaller (*p < 0.001).
We analyzed the PIT index using an ANOVA with Probability
and Cued condition as factors. Both Cued, Probability and their
interaction were significant (all p < 0.05). Post-hoc tests revealed
that both 33% and 100% Cued trials had a PIT index significantly
greater than the baseline; however, in 100% Cued trials the
PIT index was smaller than in the 33% Cued trials (all p <
0.001). The estimated size of the Cued factor was 25.4% (95%
confidence interval [20.9%; 29.9%]), meaning that in the Cued
trials participants shifted their baseline proportion of responding
by about 25 points toward the congruent action (e.g., from a
baseline of 50% of presses on the left button to 75% of presses on
the left button when the cue associated to the food congruent to
the left button was displayed). The size of the interaction between
the Cued factor and the Probability was –7.1% (95% confidence
interval: [–14.0; –0.1%]), meaning that on average the effect of
Cued trials in shifting the proportion of presses was around 7%
points weaker in the 100% probability group.
4. DISCUSSION
In the past, other studies have tested how PIT varies as a
function of the instrumental schedule (Meltzer and Hamm,
1974b, 1978; Edgar et al., 1981; Lovibond, 1983; Holland, 2004;
Wiltgen et al., 2012). These studies have found that schedules
with lower baseline rates support stronger PIT (Meltzer and
Hamm, 1974b, 1978; Edgar et al., 1981), which is also compatible
with the observation that PIT is more easily observed after
a period of extinction (Dickinson et al., 2000). Also in line
with these results, Lovibond (1983) found that CS presentation
tended to increase lever pressing in ratio schedules only during
pauses of responding. Holland (2004) found that longer training
leads to the expression of stronger PIT and Wiltgen et al.
(2012) showed that training with an interval schedule expressed
more PIT compared to a ratio-schedule with a similar baseline
rate. However, none of these studies directly investigated the
relationship between the instrumental reward probability and
the strength of specific PIT. We may hypothesize that leaner
schedules, which lead to lower baseline rates and more PIT
(Meltzer and Hamm, 1974b, 1978; Edgar et al., 1981) do so
because of a lower contingency, in line with our hypothesis that
specific PIT should be stronger when reward probability is low.
However, these studies used a single lever PIT paradigm with
only one instrumental reinforcer, so they did not measure the
CS enhancement of responding to the same outcome as the CS
(specific PIT). Even if the CS and the instrumental reinforcer
are the same, studies using a single lever PIT paradigm do
not measure specific PIT, but a general PIT effect (Corbit and
Balleine, 2005). The general PIT effect has a separate neural
substrate compared to the specific PIT effect and might be
also functionally different (Cartoni et al., 2013). Wiltgen et al.
(2012) is the only study which used two different outcomes, thus
allowing for the detection of specific PIT; however behavioral
results showed that the CS increased instrumental responding in
a non-outcome specific manner (general PIT). Besides, we did
not find differences in baseline responding between the 100%
and 33% group, so our current results cannot be explained by the
above findings.
The experimental results presented in our study show a
relationship between instrumental reward probability and the
strength of specific PIT effect. To our knowledge, this is the first
demonstration of such relationship with an explicit manipulation
of the instrumental training reward probability. As we expected,
specific PIT was weaker when the reward probability was higher.
In other words, when participants had a higher probability of
winning a reward, they were less affected by the presence of
cues associated with it. Vice versa, in the condition in which
participants had a lower probability of winning a reward, the
presence of cues had more influence on their choice.
This relationship is in line with proposals that specific PIT
works by signaling the efficacy of the instrumental actions
(i.e., their probability of reward) (Cartoni et al., 2013; Hogarth
et al., 2013, 2014). This can be contrasted with other proposals
such as a simple ideomotor S-O-R chain (e.g., see de Wit and
Dickinson, 2009, for specific PIT as S-O-R in goal-directed
behavior) or the mediated S-R account (Cohen-Hatton et al.,
2013). In the ideomotor account, the Pavlovian stimulus (S)
simply evokes its associated outcome (O) that in turns elicits
the corresponding action (R) through an O-R association learned
during instrumental training. This S-O-R hypothesis can account
for different instrumental contingencies by positing that different
contingencies change the strength of the O-R relationship. In
our case, one might then expect that in the 100% condition
the O-R association should be stronger (Elsner and Hommel,
2004), thus eliciting more specific PIT, not less. The S-O-R
hypothesis does not account for the integration of CS predictive
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information into the instrumental contingencies; it simply treats
the CS as evoking the Omemory and then the normal ideomotor
O-R process follows. In the mediated S-R account, during the
instrumental training the sight of the reward (O) evokes the
memory of the Pavlovian stimulus (S). This memory is then
associated with the instrumental response (R) creating an S-R
association even if the Pavlovian stimulus is not actually present
during the instrumental training. Again, in the mediated S-
R account one would expect that a 100% contingency giving
more rewards (O) would provide more occasions to evoke
the Pavlovian memory and thus form a stronger S-R. So the
mediated S-R account would also predict a stronger PIT in
the 100% contingency group, which is the opposite of what we
found.
In associative terms, our results would be more in line
with a hierarchical S-(R-O) association where the presence of
S modulates the expected efficacy (reward probability) of a R-
O contingency. In this view the cues (S) work as “occasion
setters” that signal when the instrumental contingency (R-O)
is in effect (i.e., is likely to produce the outcome). Thus, in
specific PIT the Pavlovian cues would work as instrumental
discriminative stimuli, even if they are not explicitly trained as
such, since they are not present in the instrumental training
sessions. Indeed discriminative stimuli do develop such S-(R-O)
relationships (Bradfield and Balleine, 2013). Recent experimental
data from Hogarth et al. (2014) provides support to these
hierarchical relationships in specific PIT. Specific PIT is known
to be resistant to the extinction of the binary Pavlovian S-O
associations (Delamater, 1996), unless these associations have
had a short training (Delamater, 2012). In Hogarth et al. (2014)
it was shown that specific PIT can be more readily abolished by
targeting the hierarchical S-(R-O) relationship rather than the S-
O association. This can be done by using either discriminative
extinction training or by explicit verbal instructions to the
participants stating that the cues would not provide information
about the most likely rewarded action (Hogarth et al., 2014).
Despite the fact that our results are in line with the idea that
specific PIT works by enhancing the participants estimates of the
reward probability, we still observed a clear specific PIT effect
even in the 100% probability group, where reward probability
is already at maximum. A possible explanation of this is that
even if they experienced a 100% reward probability during the
instrumental phase, the participants still considered the reward
as not fully certain in the test phase, thus allowing some room for
the cue to have an effect. In particular, this uncertainty could be
the result of the test phase being carried out in extinction. Even if
it was only a nominal extinction and participants were explicitly
told the rewards were still being earned as in the instrumental
phase, the removal of the visual feedback of the reward might
still have caused some uncertainty about the likelihood of reward
delivery, at a conscious or unconscious level. Indeed, in animal
studies it was found that PIT is more easily detected after a period
of extinction (Dickinson et al., 2000).
In alternative, it might simply be that there are additional
factors beyond reward probability involved in the specific PIT
effect. It will be interesting to investigate in future studies how
much the reduction of uncertainty of reward contributes to
the specific PIT effect compared to other possible factors not
involving the predictive validity of cues, such as facilitation effects
by cued retrieval of the outcome (e.g., a S-O-R account).
A limitation of this study is that the 100% probability group
received more rewards than the 33% group, so the number of
rewards is a possible confound. Future studies might include
a group with low probability but longer training to equate the
number of rewards received. The relationship between outcome
probability and specific PIT effect found in this study should
be further investigated as here we tested only two possible
probabilities. Using a wider set of probabilities should give a
better account of how the size of the specific PIT effect varies
by changing the instrumental contingency and also give a better
picture of the relevance of this factor. Despite these limitations,
this study represents a first step into the exploration of the
relationship between the instrumental contingency strength and
the specific PIT effect.
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